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Abstract
When markets are incomplete, the competitive equilibria considered so far
are not constrained Pareto{ecient, production eciency breaks down and
shareholders no longer agree on the objective function of the rm.
We rst show by way of an example that these ineciencies can result from
the double role of rms in incomplete markets: providing high market value
and providing good hedging opportunities (spanning role).
To disentangle these two conicting roles of the rm's decision, we then
suggest to let the rm choose a relevant nancial policy by issuing securities
being collaterized by the production plan. In order to guarantee that the
rm does not choose to innovate trivial assets, it is then shown to be crucial
that the rm`s shareholders agree on the same set of state prices. Therefore we
introduce some communication network into the model which allows the share-
holders to exchange their views on the rm's best policies. In our main result
we demonstrate that competitive equilibria with communication of sharehold-
ers and a relevant nancial policy of the rm are Pareto{ecient, provided
there are at least as many rms as there are shareholders.
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nancial inno-
vation.
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1 Introduction
The integration of productive activity into general equilibrium models has posed a
major challenge ever since the work of Walras. The classic Arrow-Debreu-model has
provided a solution to this task, provided that markets are complete (see e.g. Debreu
(1959)). Subsequently, the Arrow-Debreu-model has been extended to the case of
incomplete markets. Surveys of this topic can be found e.g. in Geanakoplos (1990),
Magill and Shafer (1991), and Hens (1998). Moreover, Magill and Quinzii (1996) is
an excellent text book thereon. In spite of the success of the incomplete markets
model, however, a satisfactory treatment of the theory of the rm in this model has
not yet been given. In fact, the approaches to this topic suggested so far imply that
most of the standard eciency properties derived for the general equilibrium model
with complete markets are breaking down.
When markets are complete any two commodities (available in possibly dierent
time periods and possibly contingent on certain events) can be compared by their
present value. In this case the obvious objective function of the rm is to maximize
the present value of its production. As a consequence, competitive equilibria are
Pareto{ecient and in particular the production of any one rm cannot be raised
without lowering the production of some other rm, i.e. `production eciency' holds.
Moreover, the rm's production decisions are independent from their shareholders'
preferences (i.e. the Fisher{Separation{Principle holds).
In the incomplete markets model, consumers will no longer agree on the present value
of those payos that cannot be hedged on the existing nancial markets. Hence, with-
out further assumptions, the shareholders of a rm will not agree upon the choice
of a production plan. Having realized this, one can either take some organizational
form of the rm as given and then look into the (in)-eciency properties of this or-
ganization or one could take a normative approach and try to nd the organizational
form that is most desirable according to some eciency considerations. An interest-
ing paper based on the rst approach is DeMarzo (1993) who shows that, for generic
economies, a majority rule equilibrium for a rm implies that production is optimal
for the largest, or dominant, shareholder. We will follow the second { the normative
{ approach here. Based on some eciency considerations Dreze (1974) suggested to
evaluate a rm's production plan according to the average present value vector of
its shareholders, where the weights in averaging are the shares the consumers hold.
If consumers are not allowed to trade shares of the rms, and if there is a single
consumption good in each state, this criterion leads to constrained Pareto-eciency,
i.e. competitive equilibria cannot be improved upon by a planner who has to use the
exogenously given incomplete system of nancial markets. Hence although share-
holders do not agree about the optimal production plan the Dreze{criterion as the
objective function for the rm yields the best eciency result one could hope for in
the presence of incomplete markets. Transferring this criterion to the more general
case including trade on stock markets (Dreze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979))
the resulting competitive equilibria are no longer constrained Pareto{ecient and
shareholders no longer agree that market value maximization should be the unique
aim of a rm.
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In this paper, we show that these conceptual problems could arise from the double
role of the rm's production plan when markets are incomplete: providing high
market value and providing good hedging opportunities (spanning role of a rm's
production decisions)1. To disentangle these two conicting roles we suggest to
let the rm choose a relevant nancial policy by which it issues securities being
collateralized by its production plan. The choice of these securities is based on the
spanning needs of its shareholders2. To be precise, the new securities issued by
the rm are chosen according to the average vector of its shareholders' complete
markets excess demand, where, as usual, the weights in averaging are the shares of
the consumers. The production plan is chosen exactly in the same spirit, i.e. rms
maximize the average present value of their production. In both decisions, the market
value and the spanning decision, following Grossman and Hart (1979), averages are
taken according to the initial shares of the consumers.
Note that in contrast to the standard nancial policy of the rm (which consists
of trading on a given set of nancial markets), the nancial policy we suggest is
not irrelevant in the sense of Modigliani and Miller3. Furthermore note that in
contrast to some recent literature on nancial innovation the security design decision
in our model is rather simple. It is directly based on the shareholders' spanning
needs and it does not involve any anticipation of the consequences which alternative
security designs will have for the shareholders' utility. For approaches of nancial
innovation relying on anticipation of induced changes in the competitive equilibrium
see Due and Rahi (1996), Allen and Gale (1994) and Bisin (1998), for example.
Furthermore in our model the security design is not based on any additional market
imperfections like transaction costs or oligopolistic competition. Such imperfections
interfere with the desired eciency properties of competitive equilibria. The paper
closest in spirit to our notion of nancial innovation is Citanna and Vilanacci (1996)
where an exchange economy is modeled in which every consumer can issue one asset
without incurring any costs.
When agents have dierent state prices, it can occur in this set-up that rms choose
to innovate trivial assets, i.e. not to innovate at all. In order to mitigate this ef-
fect we model a communication network by which they exchange their views on state
prices, which we call beliefs. As in the choice of the nancial policy of the rm we try
to keep things simple and model communication by some xed mechanistic process.
According to this communication process, every agent's belief (on the protability of
the rms production plans) is obtained as an average of all those agents' beliefs with
whom he communicates. For example, one could suppose that such communication
takes place in the assembly of a rm's shareholders. Introducing non-market inter-
actions like communication into a general equilibrium model, in which decisions are
generally supposed to be taken independently from each other, might be regarded
1As is well known, there are many other reasons for Pareto-ineciency in incomplete markets.
E.g. with multiple commodities in each state trading assets can change the relative prices in the
second period so as to create ineciencies { see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
2Our idea to introduce relevant nancial policy is in line with Shiller`s (2012) manifest suggesting
various ways how nance could serve better the society - one of which is issuing securities that
people need to insure their most important risks. Having rms satisfying the insurance needs of
their shareholders is a rst step in this direction.
3For a the Modigliani-Miller Theorem in the type of models considered here see DeMarzo (1988)
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as a surprising step. It becomes more evident, however, when taking a broader per-
spective on the literature. In game theory, for example, concepts of communication
are used to solve problems of coordinating strategies in normal form games (Matsui
(1991)). In general equilibrium theory coordination of net trades has been introduced
in economies with externalities (Vind (1983)). In competitive nancial markets De
Marzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) have introduced communication of beliefs. In
our model communication leads to a coordination of beliefs which in turn leads to a
coordination of asset trades.
Our main result demonstrates that competitive equilibria with communication among
shareholders and a relevant nancial policy of rms are Pareto{ecient, provided
there are at least as many rms as there are shareholders and provided some regu-
larity conditions are met which rule out degenerated cases both in the communication
network as well as in the ownership structure of rms. We show that this result is
tight in the sense that without communication or with less rms than shareholders a
planner who can anticipate the equilibrium consequences of nancial innovations can
Pareto{improve the competitive equilibrium by choosing a better nancial policy for
the rms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model and
notation. Section 3 then presents dierent forms of market structures for this model.
We begin with the well known market structure of contingent contracts and then
advance to the case of incomplete markets with stock markets. In section 4 we point
out by way of an example why stock market economies are in general constrained
Pareto-inecient. In section 5 we propose our new equilibrium concept with relevant
nancial policies and communication, and in section 6 we prove that this concept
restores Pareto-eciency. We also show in this section why the introduction of a
suciently rich communication network is essential to the results obtained. Section
7 then concludes the paper.
2 The Economy
There are two time periods, t = 0; 1, in each of which a single commodity is available.
This commodity should be thought of as expenditure for multiple commodities that
are not explicitly modeled here. There are s = 1; : : : ; S states of the world at t = 1.
Let GE = [IRS+1; (Yk)k=1;:::;K ; (X i; U i; !i; i)i=1;:::;I ] be a general equilibrium model
with
IRS+1 as commodity space,
Yk  IRS+1 being rm k's production set and
X i := IRS+1+ being consumer i's consumption set,
U i : X i ! IR as consumer i's utility function.
Consumer i`s endowments are given as
!i 2 X i of commodities and
i 2 [0; 1]K of shares of rms, whereP
i
ik = 1; all k = 1; : : : ; K.
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In order to propose our new equilibrium concept we wish to avoid unneccesary tech-
nical problems. Therefore, we will assume that GE satises strong monotonicity, con-
vexity and dierentiability assumptions as for example in Magill and Shafer (1991):
Assumption 1 (Agent characteristics) For every agent i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig the
following assumptions on utility functions and endowments are satised:
(1) U i : IRS+1+ ! IR is continuous on IRS+1+
and innitely often dierentiable on IRS+1++ .
(2) If U i() := fx 2 IRS+1+ j U i(x)  U i()g then U i()  IRS+1++ ; 8 2 IRS+1++ .
(3) For each x 2 IRS+1++ , and for all h 6= 0 such that rU i(x)h = 0 it follows that
rU i(x) 2 IRS+1++ and hTD2U i(x)h < 0 .
(4) !i 2 IRS+1++ .
An important characterization of GE-economies concerns the availability of markets
for the trading of the S+1 commodities. As a major point of reference we therefore
recall the well-known case of complete contingent contracts, i.e. the Arrow-Debreu-
model. In this model it is assumed that there exists a market for every commodity
l = 1; : : : ; S + 1, and that on each of these markets a price l; l = 1; : : : ; S + 1,
is determined. In this situation, markets are said to be complete. In a competitive
equilibrium for such an economy, every agent and every rm takes prices as given,
consumers maximize utility, rms maximize market value and all markets clear:4
Denition
An Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium is an allocation (

x;

y) 2 IR(S+1)(I+K) and
a price system

2 IRS+1 such that
1.

yk 2 arg max
yk2Yk

 yk, for every k = 1; : : : ; K
2.

xi 2 arg max
xi2X i
U i(xi), for every i = 1; : : : ; I
s.t.

  xi    !i +
KP
k=1
ik



yk
3.
IP
i=1

xi =
IP
i=1
!i +
KP
k=1

yk:
In the incomplete markets model, in contrast, agents trade on sequential spot markets
which are linked by an incomplete system of nancial markets.
In order to allow agents to transfer wealth between the uncertain states s = 1; : : : ; S,
there are nancial assets with payos in period t = 1 which can be traded in the
rst period spot market. It is assumed that both exogenous assets and shares are
4In order to simplify our notation we use the usual economists' convention that quantities are
denoted as column vectors and prices are denoted as row vectors.
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available for trade. Hence, in the rst period spot market, there are j = 1; : : : ; J
assets whose payos Aj 2 IRS are denominated in terms of the single commodity.
Let qj; j = 1; : : : ; J denote the price per unit of asset j being paid in t = 0. In
addition to the existence of (exogenous) asset markets, agents can also trade shares
in the rms on competitive stock markets. These stock markets also open in the
rst period of the two-periods model. Let rk denote the sum of the k-th rm's stock
market price and its rst period investment yk0 ; k = 1; : : : ; K. Then the matrix
determining the possible income transfers can be written as
  q  r
A Y1

, where we
have dened Y := (y1; : : : ; yK), and Y1 := (y
1
1; : : : ; y
K
1 )
5. Note that consumer i`s
portfolio, i, consists of shares of the exogenous assets and consumer i`s net trade in
the shares of the rms.
There is a well-known notion of a competitive equilibrium in this situation.
Denition Stock Market Competitive Equilibrium (FM)
A set of vectors (

;

x;

y;

q;

r;

k) with

k
"  q   r
A

Y 1
#
= 0; for every k = 1; : : : ; K is
a nancial markets competitive equilibrium for a stock market economy if
1.

yk 2 arg max
yk2Yk

kyk for every k = 1; : : : ; K
2. (

i;

xi) 2 arg max
xi2X i; i2IRJ+K
U i(xi) for every i = 1; : : : ; I
s.t. (xi   !i  P
k
ik

yk) =
"
  q   r
A

Y 1
#
i
3.
P
i

xi =
P
i
!i +
P
k

yk
4.
P
i

i = 0.
In any stock market competitive equilibrium, asset and stock market prices must be
arbitrage free, that is to say there should not exist any portfolio  2 IRJ+K which
delivers positive payos without requiring any investment, i.e. 6
6 9  2 IRJ+K :
"
  q   r
A

Y 1
#
 > 0:
By a well known result in Linear Algebra the no arbitrage condition is equivalent
5For any vector x 2 IRS+1 we let x1 := (x1; : : : ; xS) 2 IRS
6We use the standard vector inequalities x > y meaning xS  yS all s and x 6= y.
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to the existence of some strictly positive state price vector

2 IRS+1++ such that


"
  q   r
A

Y 1
#
= 0
Given any such belief


i
one can rewrite the consumer's decision problem in the
following way:
20:

xi 2 arg max
xi2X i
U i(xi)

 i  (xi   !i  
X
k
ik

yk) = 0
(xi1   !i1  
X
k
ik

yk
1) 2 < A;

Y 1> :
Moreover, in 2'. we can normalize state price vectors

 i such that

 i0 = 1. The
competitive equilibrium dened above in its so called `nancial market version' (FM)
can then equivalently be dened in the following `no-arbitrage version' (NA).
Denition Stock Market Competitive Equilibrium (NA) A set of vectors
(

x;

y;

 ) 2 IR2(I+K)(S+1) with d0 = 1 and (

d1 

d
0
1 )
h
A;

Y 1
i
= 0 for all d; d0 2
f1; : : : ; Ig [ f1; : : : ; Kg is a no{arbitrage competitive equilibrium for a stock market
economy if
1.

yk 2 arg max
yk2Yk

kyk for every k = 1; : : : ; K
2.

xi 2 arg max
xi2X i
U i(xi) for every i = 1; : : : ; I
s.t.

 i  (xi   !i  P
k
ik

yk) = 0
and (xi1   !i1  
P
k
ik

yk
1) 2 < A;

Y 1>
3.
P
i

xi =
P
i
!i +
P
k

yk.
Without loss of generality, we will further on restrict attention to the (NA) denitions
of equilibria.
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3 Constrained Pareto-ineciency of stock market
equilibria
It is well known that competitive equilibria are Pareto{ecient when markets are
complete, i.e. there does not exist an allocation (x^; y^) that is attainable (x^i 2 X i; y^k 2
Yk; P
i
xi P
i
!i +
P
k
yk) and satises U i(x^i)  U i(xi) for all i = 1; : : : ; I with one
inequality being strict.
With incomplete markets the attainability notion has to be adapted to the asset
span. In the notion of constrained Pareto{eciency one compares the equilibrium
allocations with alternative allocations that are attainable given the incomplete set
of markets.
Denition Constrained Attainability (Stock Market Economy) An alloca-
tion (x; y) 2 IR(S+1)I QKk=1 Yk is constrained attainable, if IP
i=1
xi =
IP
i=1
!i +
KP
k=1
yk
and (xi1   !i1  
P
k
(ik + 
i
k)y
k
1) 2 < A; Y1 > for every i = 1; : : : ; I.
Constrained Pareto-eciency is then straightforwardly dened as follows:
Denition Constrained Pareto{eciency
An allocation (x; y) is constrained Pareto{ecient if there does not exist an alterna-
tive constrained attainable allocation (x^; y^) that satises U i(x^i)  U i(xi); i = 1; : : : ; I
with at least one inequality being strict.
If consumers were not allowed to trade the shares of the rms as nancial assets, then
it could easily be shown that the corresponding equilibria are constrained Pareto{
ecient if the so-called \Grossman-Hart-criterion"
k =
IX
i=1
ikrU i(xi):
is used for selecting the optimal production plan (see e.g. Bettzuge and Hens (2000)).
According to this criterion, suggested by Grossman and Hart (1979), the rm should
use the average of the consumers' (normalized) present value vectors, where the
weights for averaging are the shares of the consumers.
In the stock market economy, however, this does not necessarily need to be true.
To demonstrate why this is the case, we start with noting that the shares of rms
are relevant as nancial assets only if < Y1 > is not included in < A >, i.e. if
these additional nancial markets allow the agents to better nance their net trade
on commodity markets. In particular, note that when asset markets are complete,
i.e. when < A > = IRS, then there is no reason to trade on stock markets! When
markets are incomplete, however, the choice of the production plan can have two
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eects on the consumers' budget set. As in the complete markets case the rm's
market value

  y k is part of the consumer's disposable income but in contrast to
the complete markets case the choice of the production plan aects the spanning
opportunities < A;

Y 1>.
This double role of the production plans implies that competitive equilibria of stock
market economies no longer need to be constrained Pareto-ecient. Although the
production plans in such equilibria still are prot maximal (part 1 of the denition)
they might not be chosen such as to oer the optimal span of traded assets. In fact,
since shares are traded assets, a benevolent planner now can freely determine up toK
dimensions of the subspace of traded assets. As the following example demonstrates,
his choice for the traded subset will generally not coincide with the one chosen by
the notion of competitive equilibrium. This, of course, implies that we cannot expect
competitive equilibria of a stock market economy to be constrained Pareto-ecient.
Example 17
There are two states, S = 2, two consumers, I = 2, and one rm, K = 1. Each
consumer is endowed with one unit of the commodity in the rst period and consumer
1 (2) has one unit of the commodity in state 1 (2), i.e. !1 = (1; 1; 0); !2 = (1; 0; 1).
Both consumers hold equal shares of the rm, i.e. 1 = 2 = 1
2
. Consumers do not
value rst period consumption and they evaluate second period consumption according
to some expected utility function with the same objective probabilities U i(xi0; x
i
1; x
i
2) =
ui(xi1)+u
i(xi2) for i = 1; 2: On investing both units of the commodity available in the
rst period the rm can produce second-period output given by
Y1(") = f(y1; y2) j y21 + y22  2"2g;
where we have xed y0 =  2. Figure 2 displays the second-period production possi-
bility frontier as well as the corresponding Edgeworth-Box. When asset markets are
complete, i.e. when < A > = IR2, then the Pareto{ecient competitive equilibrium
allocation is

x1 =

x2 =
1
2
0@ 01 + "
1 + "
1A ; y=
0@  2"
"
1A :
Now suppose however, that markets are seriously incomplete because < A > = f0g.
The rm's production plan, which is supposed to maximize its market value according
to some strictly positive state prices, is strictly positive in the second period, i.e.

y1 (")  0. As an eect, the second-period components of the incomplete markets
budget set collapse to the points !i1 +
1
2
<

y1> for i = 1; 2. Hence when markets are
7Note that the agents' characteristics given in example 1 do not exactly satisfy the strong
dierentiability assumptions made in the presentation of the economy (utility of the agents does
not vary with rst period consumption, utilities are not dened on the boundary of the consumption
sets, and the resources are not strictly positive). However, slightly perturbing the vector of resources
and the utility functions would restore Assumption 1 without changing the results of Example 1.
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incomplete there is no opportunity to trade and the equilibrium allocation is

x1 =
0@ 01
0
1A+ 1
2
0B@ 0y1 (")

y2 (")
1CA ; x2 =
0@ 00
1
1A+ 1
2
0B@ 0y1 (")

y2 (")
1CA :
Note that in both states s = 1; 2 the optimal output

ys (") is bounded above by
p
2 ".
Hence for " > 0 suciently small, the complete markets allocation Pareto{dominates
the incomplete markets allocation. Moreover, a planner who is running the rm could
implement the production plan y^(") =
0@  2"
 "
1A which is not market value maximizing
but which oers perfect spanning opportunities. The resulting consumption allocation
would be
x^1 =
1
2
0@ 01
1
1A+ 1
2
0@ 0"
 "
1A = x^2
which for " > 0 small enough Pareto{dominates the incomplete markets allocation.
That is to say the competitive allocation is not constrained Pareto{optimal when mar-
kets are incomplete.
Note that the reasoning of Example 1 was done for any objective function of the rm
that is exclusively based on the market value criterion. Similar examples have been
given for a specic objective function (called the Dreze-criterion) which states that
the rm uses the average present value vector of its new shareholders as the present
value vector for prot maximization (Dreze (1974), Dierker, Dierker and Grodal
(1999)). We therefore claim that the failure of constrained Pareto-eciency to hold
in stock market economies can be caused by the fact that the market value criterion
is insucient to take into account potential choices for the subspace of traded assets.
In order to restore constrained Pareto-eciency one has the following options:
1. Find a criterion for the selection of production plans which solves the inherent
trade-o between spanning and market value maximization, and adjust part 1 of the
denition of a competitive equilibrium accordingly.
2. Disentangle the production decision from the question which spanning opportu-
nities are available in the economy.
While option 1 remains unsolved, we propose a solution to option 2 in the remainder
of this paper, where we explicitly let the rms make two decisions: a nancial decision
which is relevant for spanning, and a production decision which maximizes the rms
market value.
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
6
-
?

c.m.
Y1(")
1
x12
<

Y 1>
y
1
!
x11
!i + 1
2

y1
Figure 1: Edgeworth-Box illustrating the constrained Pareto-ineciency of stock
market equilibria in Example 1
4 A new objective function for the rm
4.1 Relevant nancial policy
The objective functions for the rm which have so far been suggested in the literature
are all based exclusively on the market value criterion. However, as our Example 1
demonstrates, maximizing market value can be in apparent contrast to the interests
of the shareholders when the spanning role of the rm's decision becomes domi-
nant. To serve these two aspects of a rm's decision we suggest to disentangle the
market value aspect from the spanning aspect by allowing the rm to engage in a
relevant nancial policy. We think of the rm as having two departments, the pro-
duction department and the nance department. Both departments are controlled by
the assembly of its shareholders. The production department chooses a production
plan which maximizes the rm's market value. In doing so it uses the Grossman{
Hart{criterion which was doing ne in partnership economies where market value
maximization was the only concern of the shareholders. The nance department
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can use the production plan yk as a collateral for issuing a new security ak which
is supposed to satisfy the shareholders' spanning needs. In fact, we assume that in-
stead of issuing the direct claim on its production plan yk as a share, the rm issues
two securities, ak and (yk1   ak), both in net-supply of 1.8 Note that this policy of
issuing new securities is a nancial policy which cannot be irrelevant in the sense of
Modigliani and Miller. New nancial securities will typically have a non-trivial eect
on the marketed subspace, an eect which cannot be undone by the consumers using
the existing assets. The rm's production plan yk will typically be non-negative in
the second period. Hence the rm is an institution which credibly can promise to
deliver the period one payos of its nancial security. This is the reason why rms
play an important role as nancial innovators. Of course these reasons are exogenous
to the standard incomplete markets model without bankruptcy.9
The shareholders need to span their complete markets excess demand calculated at
prices i which they take as given
zi(i) := argmax
zi
U i(!i +
X
k
iky
k + zi)
s:t: i  zi  0
(!i +
X
k
ika
k +
X
k
ik(y
k   ak) + zi) 2 X i:
Of course dierent shareholders will have dierent spanning needs and again the rm
averages those needs according to the shares of the consumers. This gives a simple
rule for the nancial innovation decision which reects the consumers' power in the
assembly of the rms' shareholders:10
ak =
IX
i=1
ikz
i
1(
i) k = 1; : : : ; K:
Note that this criterion weighs the spanning interests of the old shareholders which
is consistent with the Grossman-Hart criterion for the production decision. From
now on we will assume that all nancial assets j = 1; : : : ; J are issued by rms, i.e.
the market subspace < A > consists of the linear space spanned by the columns
ak; k = 1; : : : ; K. Adding xed securities dierent from ak would not change our
results but would unnecessarily complicate our exposition .
Based on these suggestions we can now dene a competitive equilibirum in a stock
market economy with relevant nancial policy. Observe that in this denition we
8In this set-up, we imagine S, the set of possible states of the world, to be very large, and
especially to be much larger than the number N of securities which could potentially be innovated
by a single rm instead of its shares. For simplicity of the exposition but without loss of generality
for the results, we then assume N = 2.
9For an incomplete markets model with bankruptcy see Dubey, Geanakoplos, Shubik (1997) and
Zame (1993)
10Citanna and Villanacci (1996) consider an exchange economy where the consumers act as
nancial innovators, each of them generating the asset ai(i) = zi(i) (using our terminology).
Thus, the decision rule suggested by Citanna and Villanacci (1996) can be interpreted as the
special case of the decision rule suggested here, when production sets are given by Yk  IRS+1  for
k = 1; : : : ;K, and each rm is owned by exactly one agent.
12
restate the rm's decision problem by choosing the alternative formulation where
rm k issues asset yk in net-supply of 1, and the asset ak in zero net supply. This
restatement has been done for consistency with previous denitions only, and does
not aect our results.
Denition Stock Market Competitive Equilibrium
with Relevant Financial Policy (NA)
A set of vectors (matrices, resp.) (

x;

y;

A;

 i) with

 i 2 RS+1++ ,

 i0 = 1 and
(

1
i   d1)[

A;

Y 1] = 0 for every i; d 2 f1; : : : ; Ig is a no{arbitrage competitive equi-
librium with relevant nancial policy if
1.

yk 2 arg max
yk2Yk
(
P
i
ik

 i)yk;

ak=
P
i
ik

z i for every k = 1; : : : ; K where

z i = arg max
zi
U i(!i +
X
k
ik

yk + zi); i = 1; : : : ; I
s.t.

 i  zi  0 and (!i +
X
k
ik

yk + zi) 2 X i
2.

xi 2 arg max
xi2X i
U i(xi) for every i = 1; : : : ; I,
s.t.

 i  (xi   !i  P
k
ik

yk) = 0,
and (xi1   !i1  
P
k
ik

yk
1) 2 <

A;

Y 1>
3.
P
i

xi =
P
i
!i +
P
k

yk.
Some remarks will be useful in order to explain this equilibrium concept. Firstly,
note that the equilibrium is competitive in the traditional sense, i.e. no agent makes
any strategic conjectures about the way in which her actions will inuence the equi-
librium outcome. Consumer i simply takes the prices

 i, the production plans

y,
and the nancial policies

A as given. Producers take the prices

 i and the complete
market demands

z i of their shareholders as given. Secondly, observe that the con-
sumers' state prices are treated as exogenous; hence, when markets are incomplete,
the competitive equilibria dened above are indeterminate (cf. Due and Shafer
(1988)).
The role of the state prices

 i is analyzed in more depth in the following subsection.
First, however, we will give an example which demonstrates that the competitive
equilibria dened above are not necessarily constrained Pareto{ecient unless further
restrictions are imposed. As in Example 1, constrained Pareto{ineciency arises
from the fact that the spanning opportunities might be inecient. However, in
contrast to Example 1, this ineciency does not result from an inecient trade-o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between the production decisions. Rather, ineciency here results from inecient
nancial innovation chosen by the rms' nancial departments.11
Example 2: Consider an economy with I `unproductive' rms, i.e. Yk  IRS+1  for
every k = 1; : : : ; I. Let (

; zi(

)) be a competitive equilibrium for the corresponding
Arrow{Debreu exchange economy, i.e. letX
i
zi(

) = 0; where for all i = 1; : : : ; I
zi(

) = argmax
zi
U i(!i + zi);
s.t.

  zi  0 and (!i + zi) 2 X i:
Suppose that U i(!i + zi(

 i)) > U i(!i) for all i = 1; : : : ; I and that
ik =

1 k = i
0 k 6= i ; i; k = 1; : : : ; I:
This economy has at least the following two stock market competitive equilibria with
relevant nancial policy:
The rst equilibrium results from the observation that zi(rU i(!i)) = 0; i = 1; : : : ; I:

xi = !i; i = 1; : : : ; I

yk = 0; k = 1; : : : ; K

ak = 0; k = 1; : : : ; K

 i = rU i(!i); i = 1; : : : ; I
The second equilibrium, however, is given by the following set of vectors:

xi = !i+

z i; i = 1; : : : ; I

yk = 0; k = 1; : : : ; I

ak =

zk; k = 1; : : : ; I

 i =

; i = 1; : : : ; I
Hence the second equilibrium Pareto{dominates the rst.
The fact that rms choose an inecient set of innovated assets is based on the lack
of unanimity of the consumers` state prices

 i. Indeed, examples of this kind will
persist in stock market competitive equilibria with relevant nancial policy as long as
agents' beliefs are heterogeneous. The following subsection will therefore introduce
a framework to guarantee homogeneous beliefs in the economy.
11The following example illustrates an important result derived by Citanna and Villanacci (1996).
They show that equilibria with various degrees of "market incompleteness" can coexist in an ex-
change economy where consumers also act as nancial innovators: no innovation at all, innovation
of an incomplete set of securities, and innovation of a complete set of securities.
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4.2 Communication of beliefs
The role of beliefs
Introducing communication into interactive decision problems seems to be in con-
ict with the general equilibrium assumption that agents only interact on markets
via prices. However, in general equilibrium theory a similar step has already been
done by Vind (1983) who introduced coordination to solve the problem of externali-
ties. Game theorists should be credited for having introduced the notion of `preplay
communication' or `cheap talk' to solve some puzzles of non-cooperative game the-
ory like the coordination on Pareto{ecient Nash{equilibria (c.f. Matsui (1991)).
Similarly, in the general equilibrium model of this paper, communication can help
to select Pareto{ecient equilibria. In fact, the fundamental problem of incomplete
markets is that the prices (

q;

r) quoted by the auctioneer do not provide sucient
information how to evaluate an arbitrary payo stream y1 2 IRS. While the evalua-
tion of those components of y1 lying in the marketed subspace is unambiguous, the
evaluation of the complementary components cannot be inferred from the asset and
stock market prices. At any equilibrium (

x;

y;

A;

), however, every production plan
is unambiguously priced because obviously then

y1 lies in the marketed subspace
<

A;

Y 1>. In order to evaluate alternative production plans it would therefore be
best to know the resulting equilibrium. This knowledge, of course, is hard to get.
However agents might still form some beliefs about equilibrium prices. We therefore
suggest to interpret

 i as being consumer i's belief on the equilibrium state-prices.
Note that beliefs are based on the actual asset-stock-prices quoted by the auctioneer
and that agents hold point expectations. Hence, given the belief

 i, agent i wants
rm k to maximize the market value

 i  yk. Other agents may hold dierent beliefs
and we assume that the decision of the assembly of shareholders will reect their
inuence on the rm's market value objective, i.e.
P
i
ik

 i  yk is a natural objective
function in this respect.
Consistency of beliefs
It is natural to assume that consumers meet other consumers (for example in the
assemblies of the rms' shareholders), and that in these meetings they exchange their
dierent views on the expected equilibrium state-prices. Hence in forming their be-
liefs consumers will be inuenced by the beliefs of the other consumers. To ensure
consistency between the individual beliefs, we propose the following rather simple
consistency requirement:
i =
IX
j=1
hij
j; for every i = 1; : : : ; I;
where hij  0 denotes the weight agent i gives to agent j's belief. As a matter of
normalization,
IP
j=1
hij = 1: Hence agents form their beliefs by taking convex combi-
nations of all the other agents' beliefs. A special case arises if agents put strictly put
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positive weights only on those agents (including themselves) with whom they share
a rm. In this case, the weights h are given by hij > 0 if and only if there exists some
k 2 K such that ikjk > 0.
We can now propose the following new equilibrium concept:
Denition Competitive Stock Market Equilibrium
with Relevant Financial Policy and Communication (NA)
A set of vectors (matrices, resp.) (

x;

Y ;

A;

 i) with

 i 2 IRS+1++ ,

 i0 = 1,

 i =
P
j
hij

j,
and (

d   i)[ A;

Y 1] = 0 for every i; d = 1; : : : ; I is a no{arbitrage competitive stock
market equilibirum with relevant nancial policy and communication if
1.

yk 2 arg max
yk2Yk
(
P
i
ik

 i)yk, and

ak =
IP
i=1
ik

z i for every k = 1; : : : ; K, where

z i = arg max
zi2IRS+I
U i(!i +
X
k
ik

yk + zi)
s.t.

 i  zi  0 and (!i +
X
k
ik

yk + zi) 2 X i
2.

xi 2 arg max
xi2X i
U i(xi)for every i = 1; : : : ; I,
s.t.

 i  (xi   !i  P
k
ik

yk) = 0, and
(xi1   !i1  
P
k
ik

yk
1) 2 <

A;

Y 1>
3.
P
i

xi =
P
i
!i +
P
k

yk
In the `communication network' we can think of every consumer as a node in a graph
summarized by the following I  I matrix H =
264 h
1
1 : : : h
I
1
...
...
...
h1I : : : h
I
I
375 : How useful for a
competitive equilibrium the introduction of communication is will depend on the
structure of this graph. For example, if there is no communication (H = Id), then
beliefs are still exogenous in the new equilibrium notion .
We say consumer i is `directed connected' to consumer j if there is a chain of con-
sumers k0 = i; k1; k2; :::; km = j : h
kn
kn+1
> 0: This denes a `directed communication
graph'. Analogously one can dene an undirected communication graph by saying i is
connected to j if for some chain of consumers k0; : : : ; kn 2 I in any pair of neighbours
kj; kj+1 either h
kn
kn+1
> 0 or h
kn+1
kn
> 0.
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Generally speaking, agents' beliefs will become more homogeneous the more the
communication graphs are connected. And if two subsets of consumers are not
connected then across those subjects beliefs can remain dierent.
The next proposition proves that beliefs will become homogeneous when the following
notion of `belief connectedness' is satised:
Denition
The economy is belief connected if there is some agent d to which every other agent
is connected in the directed communications graph,i.e.:
9 d 2 I : 8j 2 I n fdg 9 j0 = j; j1; j2; :::; jm = d : hjnjn+1 > 0 8n = 0; 1; :::;m  1:
Hence a sucient condition for homogenous beliefs is that there is some expert
or "guru" whose beliefs are valued directly or indirectly by every other agent.
Proposition 1
If the economy is belief connected then the communication of beliefs leads to homo-
geneous beliefs.
Proof:
Consider any state s = 0; : : : ; S. We will show that is = 
j
s for all (i; j) 2 I  I.
Dene the vectors s := (
1
s ; : : : ; 
I
s) 2 IRS+1++ . Then s = sH from the consistency
requirement with respect to state s. The fact that
P
j h
i
j = 1 for every i 2 I then
implies that

s= (1; : : : ; 1) for some  2 IR++ is a strictly positive solution to this
system of equations.
We need to show that

s is the unique solution. To this end we show that (Id H)
has rank I 1, where Id denotes the identity matrix of dimension I. Note that belief
connectedness implies:
9d 2 I : 8J  I n fdg 9j 2 J with hji > 0 some i 2 I n J:
This claim follows from the following argument:
Let J  I nfdg. Pick any j 2 J . Then by the assumption of belief connectedness
there exists a sequence j0 = j; j1; j2; :::; jm = d; such that h
jn
jn+1
> 0 for every n =
0; 1; :::;m   1. Let n be the maximal n such that jn 2 J . By construction, n < m.
Then hjnjn+1 > 0, jn 2 J and jn+1 =2 J , which settles the claim.
Now consider the (I 1)(I 1) submatrix of (Id H) in which the d-th row and
the d-th column have been cancelled. Denote this submatrix by M := (mij)i;j2Infdg.
We now claim that M has a quasi-dominant diagonal as dened in Murata (1977,
chapter 1, Denition 6). To see this it suces to show that for any non-empty subset
J  I n fdg,
j mij j 
X
l2Jnfjg
j mlj j for all j 2 J;
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with at least one inequality being strict.
Rewriting this condition yields the condition
1  hjj 
X
l2Jnfjg
hjl ; for j 2 J;
with one inequality being strict. Now observe that by construction for any j 2 I,
1  hjj =
X
l2Infjg
hjl 
X
l2Jnfjg
hjl ; for any J  I:
It therefore remains to be shown that for any J  I n fdg there is at least one j
such that
1  hjj >
X
l2Jnfjg
hjl :
But this claim follows from the denition of d. As shown above, for any J  Infdg
there is some j 2 J such that hji for some i =2 J . Hence, for this j,X
l2Jnfjg
mlj =
X
l2Jnfjg
hjl <
X
l2fJ[figgnfjg
hjl 
X
l2Infjg
hjl = 1  hjj = mjj;
which proves that M has a quasi-dominant diagonal.
A result of Uekawa (1971) now implies that this matrix has full rank I   1 (see
Murata (1977), chapter 1, Theorem 21).
The notion of belief connectedness given in the above denition is the weakest no-
tion of connectedness we can provide, which still implies homogeneous beliefs. It is
easily seen that the notion of belief connectedness is implied by the connectedness
of the directed communication graph (henceforth referred to as `strong connected-
ness' of the communication network), and that it implies the connectedness of the
undirected communication graph (`weak connectedness'). It is also easily seen that
weak connectedness is however not sucient to imply the homogeneity of beliefs. To
see this, consider an economy with three agents in which the rst agent puts equal
weights on all three agents beliefs while the other two agents only belief in them-
selves. Obviously , even with communication, the last two agents can have dierent
beliefs although due to the beliefs of the rst agent the undirected communication
graph is connected.
In the special case where agents are connected if they meet in the assembly of share-
holders (i.e. hij > 0 if and only if 
i
k
j
k > 0 for some k = 1; : : : ; K), the matrix H is
symmetric in the sense that hij > 0 if and only if h
j
i > 0. In this case, the denitions
of \strong", \weak", and \belief" connectedness are equivalent.
Note that homogeneity of beliefs implies that the production decision of the rm
is independent from the composition of its set of shareholders, i.e. the Fisher{
Separation{Principle holds. Moreover in this case all rms evaluate their production
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plans according to the same price vector so that production eciency is also obtained
by the homogeneity of beliefs.
5 Pareto{eciency of Stock Market Equilibria with
nancial innovation and communication
In this section we will show that using our previous arguments Pareto{eciency of
stock market economies can be obtained if and only if there are `suciently many'
rms.12 The number of rms is sucient in this sense if there are at least as many
rms as there are consumers.
Note that belief connectedness itself is not sucient to imply Pareto{eciency if the
number of rms is not suciently large and no relevant nancial policy is possible.
This claim follows from a reconsideration of our Example 1. In this example, as-
signing any strictly positive vector of state prices to the rm will lead to the choice
of production plans which prohibit risk sharing! In particular the rms' state price
vectors can be chosen to be the homogeneous beliefs which agents might hold.
Now suppose, however, that the rm in Example 1 could make two separate decisions:
On the one hand it chooses a production plan such as to maximize the rms' market
value , on the other hand, and completely independently, it issues a nancial security
such as to accomodate its shareholders spanning needs. Then complete risk sharing
would be provided and a Pareto-ecient solution would be achieved.
Example 1 (continued)
Slightly modifying the assumptions, assume now that 1 = 1=4 and 2 = 3=4, i.e.
that ownership in the rm is no longer equally shared between the consumers.13 We
claim that the Pareto-ecient allocation

x1 =
1
4
(0; 2 + "; 2 + ") and

x2 =
1
4
(0; 2 + 3"; 2 + 3")
is a competitive equilibrium with relevant nancial policy and communication. In
fact, letting

 i = (1; 1; 1), i = 1; 2, all consistency requirements are met. Then

y= ( 2; "; ") and hence
z1(

) =
1
4
( 2; 2) and
z2(

) =
1
4
(2; 2):
12It is well-known that in special cases one does not need such a lower bound on the number of
rms. An important example is given by the assumption of \equilibrium spanning" introduced by
Diamond (1967) and discussed in Eichberger and Harper (1997, Chapter 5.2.2). This assumption
states that the production plans chosen by the rms in equilibrium span a subspace containing
every rm's production set. The assumption of \equilibrium spanning" will generically be satised
in the (very) special case where all production sets lie in some K-dimensional subspace of IRS+1.
13Otherwise the rank condition stated in the following theorem is no longer satised.
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Hence the rm will innovate the nancial asset

a=
1
4

z1 +
3
4

z2 =
1
4
(1; 1)
But this is exactly the asset, which the consumers need to eectuate their desired
net-trades, i.e.
(

xi1   i

y1  !i1) 2<

a> :
Hence, by disentangling the problems of market value maximization and of nancial
innovation, complete risk sharing in the economy can be obtained. The following
theorem shows that this point is true in general. It is important to note here, that
the following result does not impose any restrictions on S, that is on the magnitude of
the number of potential states of the world. Theorem 1 is derived from the nancial
policy of the rm.
Theorem 1
Suppose the economy is belief connected and the matrix of ownership has rank 4 = I
or rank [4nd  d1I] = I 1 for some d 2 I. Then competitive stock market equilibria
with relevant nancial policy and communication are Pareto{ecient 14.
Proof:
The result follows from the claim that under the assumptions stated a stock market
equilibrium with relevant nancial policy and communication is, in fact, also an
Arrow-Debreu-equilibrium allocation.
To prove this claim, let
((

 i;

xi)i=1;:::;I ;

Y ;

A)
be a stock market equilibrium with relevant nancial policy and communication
(NA). From Proposition 1 we know that belief connectedness implies that

1 =

2 = : : : =

I =

 :
We claim that

 is an equilibrium state price vector for the Arrow-Debreu-model.
First note, that the production decision of the rm is the same for both equilibrium
concepts. Secondly, note that both concepts have the same market clearing condi-
tions. Thus, it only remains to show that the consumption decisions of the agents
remain unchanged when moving from the stock market model to the Arrow-Debreu
situation. To show this it suces to prove that the agents complete markets demand
is spanned, i.e. that
zi1(

) 2<

Y1;

A> :
14We use the following notation: 4 = [1; : : : ; I ] 2 IRKI ; 4nd = [1; : : : ; d 1; d+1; : : : ; I ] 2
IRK(I 1); A = [a1; : : : ; aK ] 2 IRSK ; Z1 = [z11 ; : : : ; zI1 ] 2 IRSI ; Znd1 =
[z11 ; : : : ; z
d 1
1 ; z
d+1
1 ; : : : ; z
I ] 2 IRS(I 1); 1I = (1; : : : ; 1) 2 IRI 1.
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In the rst case this claim follows from the equilibrium condition

A=

Z1 T
by observing that under the assumptions made the matrix of share ownership T
has a right inverse.
To see the second case, suppose that there exists some d 2 I such that rank [4nd  
d1I] = I 1. Since then z i corresponds to the equilibrium net trades in the complete
markets model, it follows that zd1(

) =  P
i 6=d
zi1(

). Hence rm k's nancial policy
can be written as
ak =
IX
i=1
ikz
i
1(

)
=
X
i6=d
(ik   dk)zd1(

); k = 1; : : : ; K:
Written more compactly, this is:
A = Z
nd
1 [4nd   d1I]: Solving for Znd1 we arrive at:
Z
nd
1 = A[4nd   d1I]Tf[4nd   d1I][4nd   d1I]Tg 1
that is to say zi1 2 < A >; i 6= d.
Since zd1(

) =  P
i 6=d
zi1(

), from this it also follows that zd1 2 < A >, and we obtain
that zi1(

) 2 < A >; i = 1; : : : ; I.
Note that, generically in ik, rg[4nd   d1I] = I   1 provided K  I   1. Hence a
sucient assumption to obtain both belief connectedness and full rank is K  I   1
provided consumers' initial shares are chosen from some generic subset of the set of
all positive K K matrices..
For an intuition of this claim reconsider Example 1 once again. In the case where
1 = 2 = 1
2
, the economy is belief connected, rg(4) = I   1 but still equilibria are
not Pareto{ecient because then

a= 1z11(

)+ 2z21(

) = 1
2
(z11(

)+ z21(

)) = 0. This
choice of initial shares violates the rank condition rank [4nd   d1I] = I  1 because
in this case [4nd d1I] = (1 2d) which is 0 for both agents d = 1; 2. However, this
choice is clearly exceptional and as mentioned above any other choice would lead to
full Pareto{eciency because

a= (1  21)z11(

).
For an interpretation of Theorem 1 note that in our Example 2 with I rms using
an active nancial policy the communication of beliefs selects the Pareto{ecient
equilibrium. Hence in this setting ecient nancial innovation can be seen as a
coordination problem (Citanna and Villanacci (1996)) which we solve by introducing
communication. Before closing note that the condition K  I   1 is not tight since
to some extent agents` excess demands can also be spanned by the stock markets.
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6 Conclusion
When markets are incomplete the rm's production decision has two eects on con-
sumers: it changes the market value of their shares and it changes their risk sharing
opportunities. To disentangle these two conicting objectives we allow the rm to
choose some active nancial policy, i.e. to issue assets for which the production plan
is used as collateral.
We assume that consumers hold beliefs about the protability of alternative produc-
tion plans. Depending on the degree of heterogeneity of beliefs the resulting equilibria
can be Pareto{ecient or Pareto{inecient. The question of Pareto{eciency then
becomes a coordination problem which we solve by communication of beliefs. Our
main results show that stock market equilibria with active nancial policy and com-
munication are Pareto{ecient provided there are at least as many rms as there
are consumers.
Further research should investigate our idea in multi-commodity and multi-period
models in which interesting observations on the theory of the rm have recently been
made by Bonnisseau and Lachiri (2004 and 2006) and by Dierker (2012).
References
[1] Allen, F. and D. Gale (1994), "Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing",
MIT-Press, Cambridge MA.
[2] Bettzuge, M.O. and Th. Hens (2000), "Financial Innovation, Communi-
cation and the Theory of the Firm", IEW-discussion paper No.32 University
of Zurich.
[3] Bisin, A. (1998), "General Equilibrium Economies with Imperfectly Compe-
titive Financial Intermediaries", Journal of Economic Theory 82 (1), 19-45.
[4] Bonnisseau, J.-M. and O. Lachiri (2004), "On the objective of rms
under uncertainty with stock markets", Journal of Mathematical Economics
40, 493-513.
[5] Bonnisseau, J.-M. and O. Lachiri (2006), "About the second theorem
of welfare economics with stock markets", Pacic Journal of Optimization 2,
469-485.
[6] Citanna, A. and A. Villanacci (1996), "Financial Innovation and Ex-
pectations", Penn CARESS Working Paper.
[7] Debreu, G. (1959), "Theory of Value", Wiley New York.
[8] De Marzo, P. (1988), "An Extension of the Modigliani Miller Theorem to
Stochastic Economies with Incomplete Markets", Journal of Economic Theory
45, pp. 353-369.
22
[9] De Marzo, P (1993), "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Role
of the Dominant Shareholder", Review of Economic Studies 60 (3), July '93,
pp. 713-34.
[10] De Marzo, P., Vayanos, S. and J. Zwiebel (2003), "Persuasion Bias,
Social Inuence, and Unidimensional Opinions", Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 118 (3), pp. 909-968.
[11] Diamond, P. (1967), "The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium
Model with Technological Uncertainty", American Economic Review 57, pp.
759-76.
[12] Dierker, E., Dierker, H. and B. Grodal (1999), "Incomplete Mar-
kets and the Firm", Discussion Paper No 99-03, Department of Economics,
University of Copenhagen.
[13] Dierker, E., H. Dierker, and B. Grodal (2005), "Are incomplete
markets able to achieve minimal eciency?", Economic Theory 25, 75-87.
[14] Dierker, E. (2012), "Multiperiod production economies with incomplete
markets and the ineciency of price taking behavior", Institute for Advanced
Studies Vienna, Working Paper No. 290.
[15] Dreze, J. (1974), "Investment under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equi-
librium and Stability", in: Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Op-
timality, J.H. Dreze ed. New York: Wiley, 129-165.
[16] Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., Shubik, M. (2003), "Default and Eciency
in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets", Cowles Founda-
tion, Yale University, Working Paper No. 1247.
[17] Duffie, D. and R. Rahi (1995), "Financial Market Innovation and Security
Design", Journal of Economic Theory Symposium on Financial Innovation and
Security Design, Vol. 65 (1), pp. 1-42.
[18] Duffie, D. and W. Shafer (1988), "Equilibrium and the role of the rm
in incomplete markets", GSB working paper No. 915, Stanford University.
[19] Eichberger, J. and I.R. Harper (1997), "Financial Economics", Oxford
University Press: Oxford.
[20] Geanakoplos, J.D. (1990), "An Introduction to General Equilibrium with
Incomplete Asset Markets", Journal of Mathematical Economics 19, pp. 1-38.
[21] Geanakoplos, J.D. and H.M. Polemarchakis (1986), "Existence, regu-
larity and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset
structure is incomplete", in: W.P. Hell, R.M: Starr and D.A. Starrett, eds.,
Uncertainty, information and communication: Essays in honor of K.J. Arrow.
Vol. 3 (Cambridge Universitv Press, New York), pp. 65-95.
23
[22] Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1979) "A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium
in Stock Market Economies", Econometrica 47, pp. 293-330.
[23] Hens, Th. (1998), "Incomplete Markets", Chapter 5 in: Elements of General
Equilibrium Theory, Festschrift in Honor of G. Debreu , A. Kirman (ed.),
Blackwell Publishers.
[24] Magill, M. and W. Shafer (1991), "Incomplete Markets", in: Handbook
of Mathematical Economies, Vol. 4.
[25] Magill, M. and M. Quinzii (1996), "Theory of Incomplete Markets",MIT-
Press.
[26] Matsui (1991), "Cheap talk and cooperation in society", JET (54), pp. 245-
58.
[27] Murata, Y. (1977), "Mathematics for Stability and Optimization of Eco-
nomic Systems", Academic Press: New York.
[28] Shiller, R.J. (2012), "Finance and the Good Society", Princeton University
Press.
[29] Uekawa, Y. (1971), "Generalization of the Stolper-Samuelson-Theorem",
Econometrica (39), pp. 197-217.
[30] Vind,K. (1983), "Equilibrium with Coordination", Journal of Mathematical
Economics (12), pp. 272-285.
[31] Zame, W. (1993), "Eciency and the Role of Default when Security Markets
are Incomplete", American Economic Review 83, 1142-1164.
24
